Twentieth Anniversary Plenary of the Australia Group

Distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen

I am especially pleased to be here today to open formally the 20th anniversary Plenary of the Australia Group.

And fitting that on this occasion the meeting should be held, for the first time, in Australia.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a real and immediate threat. The possibility of terrorists and irresponsible states obtaining and using weapons of mass destruction is taken very seriously by the Australian Government. It is our position that we must confront this threat directly - with concrete action and not mere talk of action.

In this context, the Australia Group stands at the forefront of Australia's counter-proliferation efforts. The Group's forward thinking, cohesive and pragmatic approach to preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction ensures it achieves practical gains in the fight against proliferation.

It is 20 years since Australia convened the first meeting of 15 like-minded countries in 1985 in Brussels.

That meeting was a response to the findings of a UN investigation, led by an Australian - Dr Peter Dunn, that Iraq had used chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war. It posed the question of how to prevent Iraq from acquiring materials for the production of chemical weapons through otherwise legitimate commercial trade.

The response - a proposal to harmonise national export controls - was endorsed by all present at that meeting, and the Australia Group was born.

Achievements Since 1985

The Group's achievements over the past 20 years have been significant.

It has developed comprehensive lists to control trade in dual-use chemicals and equipment and, since the emerging threat of biological weapons became apparent in the early 1990s, it has also developed lists to prevent the diversion of materials to biological weapons programs.

The lists, as they currently stand, cover 63 chemical precursors, 32 viruses, 32 plant and animal pathogens, as well as various bacteria, toxins and relevant dual-use chemical and biological equipment.

Harmonisation of these standards between Australia Group members has significantly restricted opportunities for would-be proliferators to source the chemical and biological components required for making chemical and biological weapons through normal trade channels.

These same measures have also protected members from inadvertently allowing dual-use materials to fall into the wrong hands.

In the past the Australia Group has attracted some criticism - with some claims that the export controls it promotes restrict the access of developing countries to technology transfers.

Others have complained that the function of the Australia Group would be more properly exercised under the auspices of multilateral treaties such as the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention.

However, these criticisms have become steadily less vocal in recent years and it is worth considering why.

While many states parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention apply export controls in the implementation of their convention obligations, others do not.

And many fail to enforce controls in a robust and effective manner.

Moreover, in the absence of a verification body for the Biological Weapons Convention, the Australia Group's development of control lists covering materials and technology relevant to the production of biological weapons represent the only harmonised form of control over these items.

Increased trade and technology transfers in the chemical and biotechnology sectors are in the economic interests of all countries.

It has become increasingly apparent that the well-balanced and harmonised export controls implemented by Australia Group members have brought increased security to this trade, without restricting legitimate trade.

Osama Bin Laden has publicly stated since the late 1990s Al Qaida's willingness to acquire and use chemical and biological weapons. Last year, a police raid on the house of an alleged Jemaah Islamiyah operative in the southern Philippines discovered a JI training manual for chemical and biological terrorism. In 2003 four men were charged with terrorism offences in London after recipes and ingredients for making ricin - an Australia Group controlled toxin - were discovered in two houses.

In view of this, many non-Australia Group members have recognised the real value of the Australia Group's comprehensive control lists in preventing chemical and biological weapons-relevant items and technology falling into the hands of proliferators.

The success of the Group in promoting balanced and consistent national export controls is well demonstrated by its now expanded participation - from 15 participants in 1985 to 38 countries plus the European Commission today.

We can also be reassured by the increasing number of non-participating countries, including important suppliers like China and Russia, which are looking to Australia Group control lists and measures in the formulation of their own export controls. Just last week I received a letter from my Israeli counterpart affirming Israel's voluntary adherence to Australia Group export control standards.

This acceptance of Australia Group standards as the international benchmark for export controls provides clear evidence that the strategies of the Group work to promote secure trade, rather than to restrict trade.

New and Future Challenges

But despite our successes we should not become complacent.

The international security environment has changed markedly over recent years and the global threat posed by chemical and biological weapons is in many respects more challenging today.

Several countries continue to actively pursue weapons of mass destruction programs in defiance of international non-proliferation norms.

The sarin gas attacks in the Tokyo subway in 1995 and the anthrax letter attacks following the tragic events of September 11 are clear reminders of the devastating impact that chemical and biological weapons terrorism can have.

Proliferators are resorting to ever more sophisticated methods for procuring the materials they require to manufacture chemical and biological weapons. This was amply demonstrated in the nuclear area by the vast procurement network established by Dr AQ Khan.

Strategies such as the transhipment and re-export of items make illicit trade particularly difficult to detect and to combat.

Brokering, in the form of front companies and intermediaries, also serves to mask the true end-use of dual-use exports and makes the enforcement of export controls more difficult.

These practices require the utmost vigilance from members in monitoring the destination and end-use of trade in dual-use items.

The rapid pace of technological change, including the spectacular growth of the biotechnology sector, makes the task of keeping lists of controlled items up to date increasingly challenging.

Globalisation, with advances in telecommunications and ease of international travel, has made it easier to transfer technical data and "know-how" through intangible means.

Such transactions cannot be monitored by traditional means.

There have, of course, been some notable success stories. Libya's decision to forgo its WMD ambitions, including an extensive chemical weapons program, can only serve to renew the zeal of Australia Group members.

Way Ahead

Staying one step ahead of proliferators is no easy task, but a necessary one to ensure that the work of the Australia Group remains relevant.

Fresh thinking is required to ensure that adequate measures are in place to prevent the unauthorised transfer of sensitive technologies and know-how.

Emphasis needs to be placed on improving compliance by raising awareness domestically, especially to address local sourcing by terrorist groups.

Outreach to industry and academia improves the system by making sure that those on the frontline understand the licensing process, the reasoning behind it, and are alert to suspicious contacts and behaviour.

After all, the system is only as effective as its implementation.

So, as you can see, the agenda for this 20th anniversary plenary and beyond is a broad and demanding one.

It demonstrates not only how far we have come, but also the need for the Australia Group to continue to evolve as a forum to address changing and developing proliferation threats.

The Group has a deserved reputation for being pragmatic and focused in the face of such challenges.

And I do not doubt that discussions here this week will be any different.

With this in mind, it is my pleasure to open formally the 2005 Plenary.